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INTERNATIONAL	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW	  AND	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  
RIGHTS:	  IN	  FAVOUR	  OF	  SYNERGY	  
	  
Fiona	  De	  Londras1	  	  
	  
ABSTRACT	  
This	   paper	   is	   concerned	   with	   demonstrating	   the	   capacity	   of	  
international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  domestic	  constitutional	  law	  to	  have	  
a	   synergistic	   relationship	   that	   is	   focused	  on	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   two	  
sets	   of	   standards	   can	   be	   harmonised	   rather	   than	   on	   questions	   of	  
‘superiority’	  and	  ‘inferiority’.	  Conceiving	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
two	   bodies	   of	   law	   in	   this	   way	   requires	   us	   to	   recognise	   their	   shared	  
dignitary	  core	  and	  the	  optimal	  effect	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  
namely	   effective	   rights-­protection	   at	   the	   domestic	   level	   with	  
international	  law	  playing	  a	  subsidiary	  role.	  This	  paper	  uses	  the	  example	  
of	  LGBT	  rights	   in	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  jurisprudence	  
to	   demonstrate	   such	   a	   synergistic	   relationship	   and	   argues	   that	   such	   a	  
relationship	   is	   possible	   as	   between	   US	   constitutional	   law	   and	  
international	   human	   rights	   law	   notwithstanding	   some	   prima	   facie	  
barriers	  thereto.	  	  	  	   1. INTRODUCTION	  It	   is	   sometimes	  said	   that	   the	  United	  States	  has	  a	  particular	  antipathy	  to	  international	  law	  and	  internationalism;	  that	  it	  neither	  ‘gets	  it’	  nor	  wants	  to	  ‘get	   it’.2	  This,	   in	  my	  view,	   is	  a	  misrepresentation	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  United	  States	   in	   respect	   of	   international	   law	   generally,	   although	   it	   is	   perhaps	  somewhat	   closer	   to	   the	   truth	   in	   relation	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	  than	   in	   other	   areas.3	   This	   representation	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   alleged	  
                                                       1	  	  (BCL,	  LL.M.,	  Ph.D	  (NUI));	  Lecturer,	  UCD	  School	  of	  Law.	  	  This	  paper	  was	  begun	  for	  a	  presentation	  at	  a	  conference	  entitled,	  ‘Civil	  Rights	  in	  the	  Obama	  Era’	  at	  Valparaiso	  University	  School	  of	  Law.	  	  	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Professor	  Penelope	  Andrews	  for	  the	  invitation	  to	  participate	  and	  to	  all	  who	  attended	  for	  their	  comments	  and	  observations.	  	  	  Editor’s	  note:	  	  The	  spelling	  in	  this	  article	  is	  based	  on	  the	  European	  English	  model,	  not	  the	  American	  version.	  	  	  2	  Peter	  Spiro,	  The	  New	  Sovereigntists:	  American	  Exceptionalism	  and	  its	  False	  Prophets	  79	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS	  9	  (2000)	  3	  I	  have	  previously	  classified	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  á	  la	  carte	  internationalist.	  See	  Fiona	  de	  Londras,	  Dualism,	  Domestic	  Courts	  and	  the	  International	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  IUS	  GENTIUM:	  THE	  RULE	  OF	  LAW	  IN	  COMPARATIVE	  PERSPECTIVE	  (Mortimer	  Sellers	  and	  Tadeusz	  Tomaszewski,	  eds,	  2010).	  In	  relation	  to	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  treaties,	  however,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  traditionally	  shown	  reluctance	  to	  effectively	  bind	  itself	  to	  such	  treaties	  either	  by	  non-­‐ratification	  or,	  where	  a	  treaty	  is	  ratified,	  by	  non-­‐incorporation	  and	  the	  express	  designation	  of	  a	  treaty	  as	  non-­‐self-­‐executing	  and	  therefore	  not	  incorporated	  into	  law	  by	  the	  Supremacy	  Clause	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  See	  Kenneth	  Roth,	  The	  Charade	  of	  US	  Ratification	  of	  International	  Human	  
Rights	  Treaties	  1	  CHINESE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  347	  (2000).	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568879
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  relationship	   with	   international	   law	   reflects	   the	   fact	   that	   both	   the	   US	   and	   a	  substantial	   portion	   of	   the	   international	   legal	   community	   are	   engaged	   in	   a	  process	  of	  mythologizing	   in	   relation	   to	  one	   another	   that	  perhaps	  reaches	   its	  zenith	  when	  it	  concerns	  international	  human	  rights	   law.	  The	  United	  States	   is	  mythologized	   as	   an	   isolationist	   and	   anti-­‐internationalist	   legal	   system,4	  while	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  mythologized	  as	  a	  top-­‐down,	  ‘un-­‐American’,	  and	  anti-­‐democratic	  enterprise.5	  	  	  The	  first	  step	  for	  anyone	  concerned	  with	  highlighting	  the	  potential	  for	  international	   human	   rights	   law	   to	   play	   a	   valuable	   role	   in	   rights-­‐related	  litigation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  to	  ‘myth-­‐bust’	  in	  both	  directions.	  In	  this	  article	  I	   intend	  to	  argue	  that	   in	  fact	  United	  States	  constitutional	  civil	  rights	   law	  and	  international	  human	  rights	   law	  share	  a	  common	  core	  of	  values	  and	  purposes	  that	  make	  them	  the	  ideal	  theatre	  in	  which	  synergistic	  and	  catalytic	  interaction	  between	   domestic	   and	   international	   law	   can	   take	   place.	   This	   is,	   indeed,	   the	  type	  of	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	   law	   that	   is	   foreseen	  and	   intended	  by	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	  has	   happened	   in	   other	  jurisdictions	   and	   contexts,	   such	   as	   in	   relation	   to	   LGBT	   rights	   in	   (Western)	  Europe.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  argue	  that	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  binding	  in	   domestic	   law.	   The	   status	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   domestic	  legal	   systems	   is	   a	   matter	   for	   those	   systems	   themselves.	   Under	   US	  constitutional	   law	   international	  human	  rights	   law	   is	  part	  of	   federal	   common	  law	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   is	   customary	   international	   law	   and	   reliant	   on	  incorporation	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   is	   contained	   in	   non-­‐self-­‐executing	   treaties	  ratified	   by	   the	  United	   States	  with	   the	   advice	   and	   consent	   of	   the	   Senate.	   The	  argument	  made	  out	  here	  does	  not	   seek	   to	  challenge	   that.	  Rather,	   this	  article	  argues	   that	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   is	   an	   appropriate	   source	   of	  persuasive	  authority	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  pleaded	  in	  cases	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  interpretation.	   This	  might	  ensure	   that,	   to	   the	  extent	   possible	  within	   the	   text	  and	   structure	   of	   the	   Constitution	   itself,	   rights	   afforded	   constitutional	  
                                                                                                                                            United	  States	  position	  relating	  to	  international	  law	  generally,	  including	  reflections	  on	  international	  law,	  see	  the	  thoughtful	  and	  careful	  analysis	  in	  David	  Bederman,	  Globalization,	  
International	  Law	  and	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  50	  EMORY	  LAW	  JOURNAL	  717	  (2001).	  4	  See,	  for	  example,	  Thomas	  Hughes,	  The	  Twilight	  of	  Internationalism	  61	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS	  25	  (1985-­‐86)	  (tracing	  the	  growth	  of	  anti-­‐internationalist	  sentiment	  in	  the	  United	  States);	  Alison	  Dundes	  Renteln,	  Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  the	  CRC:	  Objections	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  3	  ILSA	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  AND	  COMPARATIVE	  LAW	  629	  (1996-­‐97)	  (noting	  the	  “anti-­‐international	  attitude	  which	  seems	  prevalent	  in	  [the	  United	  States]	  in	  the	  1990s”	  at	  636).	  5	  See,	  for	  example,	  ERIC	  POSNER	  &	  JACK	  GOLDSMITH,	  THE	  LIMITS	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (2006)	  (on	  international	  law	  generally);	  John	  O.	  McGuinness	  &	  Ilya	  Somin,	  Democracy	  and	  Human	  Rights	  
Law	  84	  NOTRE	  DAME	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1739	  (2009);	  John	  O.	  McGuinness	  &	  Ilya	  Somin,	  Should	  
International	  Law	  be	  Part	  of	  Our	  Law?	  59	  STANFORD	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1175	  (2007)	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  protection	   are	   harmonious	  with	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   terms	   of	  content	   and	   scope.	   International	   human	   rights	   law,	   then,	   is	   presented	   as	   an	  interpretive	   aid	   in	   domestic	   rights	   interpretation,	   application	   and	  enforcement.	  	  The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   article	   expands	   on	   the	   appropriate	   relationship	  between	   international	   and	   domestic	   rights	   law	   and	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   one	   of	  synergy	   rather	   than	   one	   of	   superiority	   or	   inferiority.	   Far	   from	   the	   myriad	  adjudicatory	   bodies	   that	   have	   appeared	   in	   international	   human	   rights	   law	  representing	   some	   kind	   of	   strong-­‐arm	   measures	   by	   international	   law,	   their	  admissibility	  rules	  in	  particular	  show	  that	  the	  desired	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  one	  in	  which	   rights	   are	   effectively	   protected	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere	   without	   any	  recourse	   to	   the	   international	   legal	   machinery.	   The	   article	   then	   goes	   on	   to	  illustrate	   the	   type	   of	   synergistic	   relationship	   that	   is	   possible	   between	  domestic	  and	  international	  rights-­‐protecting	  law	  by	  means	  of	  the	  example	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  in	  Europe.	  In	  several	  different	  areas	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  activism	  and	  advocacy,	   litigants	   found	   it	   necessary	   to	   bring	   their	   cases	   to	   the	   European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,6	  based	  in	  Strasbourg.	   	   	  These	  cases	  were	  brought	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  resolving	  whether	  domestic	  laws,	  by	  which	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minorities	   were	   differentially	   treated,were	   permissible	   under	   the	   European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.7	  What	  is	  important	  about	  these	  cases,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  this	  article,	   is	   that	  they	  frequently	   involved	   the	  Court	   in	  using	  synergistic	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   such	   as	   ‘European	   consensus’	   in	  adjudicating	  on	  the	  complaints	  before	  them.	  	  Having	   established	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   synergistic	   relationship	  between	   international	   and	  domestic	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   the	   second	  part	   of	  the	  article	  and	   the	  desirability	  and	  appropriateness	  of	   such	  a	   relationship	   in	  the	  first	  part,	  the	  third	  part	  of	  this	  article	  goes	  on	  to	  consider	  whether	  such	  a	  relationship	   is	   possible	   or	   appropriate	   in	   the	   United	   States	   given	   the	  constitutional	  position	  of	  international	   law.	  In	  this	  Part,	  I	  argue	  that	  although	  there	  are	  some	  prima	  facie	  structural	  impediments	  to	  the	  use	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  constitutional	  rights	  adjudication,	  these	  impediments	  are	  not	   insurmountable.	   However,	   successfully	   overcoming	   them	   requires	   a	  
                                                       6	  This	  is	  the	  court	  that	  adjudicates	  on	  individual	  and	  inter-­‐state	  complaints	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  advisory	  opinions	  on	  the	  rare	  occasions	  in	  which	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  requests	  same.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  its	  organisational	  home—the	  Council	  of	  Europe—see	  DAVID	  HARRIS,	  MICHAEL	  O’BOYLE,	  ED	  BATES	  &	  CARLA	  BUCKLEY,	  HARRIS,	  O’BOYLE	  &	  WARBRICK:	  LAW	  OF	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	  ON	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS,	  (2nd	  ed.,	  2009),	  Chapter	  1.	  7	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  213	  U.N.T.S.	  222,	  entered	  into	  force	  Sept.	  3,	  1953	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  particular	   attitudinal	   approach	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   that	   may	  require	  acculturation.	  2. PART	  I:	  	  SYNERGY	  OR	  SUPERIORITY	  When	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights8	  was	  signed	  in	  1948	  few	   people	   could	   have	   foreseen	   the	   immense	   development	   of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	   that	  would	  emerge	  over	   the	   next	   sixty	  years.	   In	   this	   short	  period	  of	  time	  we	  have	  seen	  international	  human	  rights	   law	  progress	  from	  a	  set	   of	   normative	   statements,	   purely	   declaratory	   in	   manner	   (at	   least	   at	   the	  outset9)	   to	  a	   plethora	   of	  binding	   international	   instruments	   (both	  universal,10	  regional11	   and	   organisational12);	   human	   rights	   clauses	   in	   Security	   Council	  Chapter	  VII	  Resolutions;13	  human	  rights	  tie-­‐ins	  in	  regional	  trade	  agreements;14	  and	   international	   adjudicatory	   bodies	   with	   jurisdiction	   over	   treaty-­‐based	  rights	  claims.	  These	  international	  adjudicatory	  bodies	  range	  from	  courts	  with	  jurisdiction	   over	   individual	   and	   inter-­‐state	   complaints	   to	   treaty-­‐specific	  committees,	  many	  of	  which	  also	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  hear	  and	  adjudicate	  upon	  individual	  complaints.	  	  
                                                       8	  G.A.	  res.	  217A	  (III),	  U.N.	  Doc	  A/810	  at	  71	  (1948)	  9	  On	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  on	  the	  development	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  see	  Juan	  E.	  Mendez,	  Anniversary	  Contributions:	  International	  
Human	  Rights	  Law:	  60th	  Anniversary	  of	  the	  UDHR	  30	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  PENNSYLVANIA	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  1157	  (2009)	  10	  Universal	  human	  rights	  law	  instruments	  are	  both	  general	  and	  specific.	  The	  general	  human	  rights	  law	  instruments	  making	  up	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  International	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  are	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (G.A.	  res.	  2200A	  (XXI),	  21	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  16)	  at	  52,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/6316	  (1966),	  999	  U.N.T.S.	  171,	  entered	  into	  force	  Mar.	  23,	  1976)	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (G.A.	  res.	  2200A	  (XXI),	  21	  U.N.GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  16)	  at	  49,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/6316	  (1966),	  993	  U.N.T.S.	  3,	  entered	  into	  force	  Jan.	  3,	  1976).	  There	  are	  also	  specific	  universal	  human	  rights	  instruments	  such	  as,	  although	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  (G.A.	  res.	  34/180,	  34	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  46)	  at	  193,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/34/46,	  entered	  into	  force	  Sept.	  3,	  1981)	  and	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	  (G.A.	  res.	  44/25,	  annex,	  44	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  49)	  at	  167,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/44/49	  (1989),	  entered	  into	  force	  Sept.	  2	  1990).	  11	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  supra	  note	  7;	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  O.A.S.Treaty	  Series	  No.	  36,	  1144	  U.N.T.S.	  123,	  entered	  into	  
force	  July	  18,	  1978;	  African	  [Banjul]	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  adopted	  June	  27,	  1981,	  OAU	  Doc.	  CAB/LEG/67/3	  rev.	  5,	  21	  I.L.M.	  58	  (1982),	  entered	  into	  force	  Oct.	  21,	  1986;	  Arab	  Charter	  on	  Human	  Rights	  September	  15,	  1994,	  reprinted	  in	  18	  Hum.	  Rts.	  L.J.	  151	  (1997).	  	  12	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  2000	  O.J.	  (C	  364)	  1	  (Dec.	  7,	  2000).	  13	  See,	  for	  example,	  Operative	  Paragraph	  6,	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1456	  (2003)	  providing	  that	  “[s]tates	  must	  ensure	  that	  any	  measure	  taken	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  comply	  with	  all	  their	  obligations	  under	  international	  law,	  and	  should	  adopt	  such	  measures	  in	  accordance	  with	  inter-­‐national	  law,	  in	  particular	  international	  human	  rights,	  refugee,	  and	  humanitarian	  law”.	  14	  See	  generally	  FREDERICK	  ABBOTT,	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  AND	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS:	  FOUNDATIONS	  AND	  CONCEPTUAL	  ISSUES	  (2006).	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  The	  development	  of	  these	  international	  adjudicatory	  bodies	  is	  a	  clear	  recognition	   of	   the	   need	   for	   rights	   not	   only	   to	   be	   enshrined	   in	   international	  instruments	   but	   also	   to	   be	   effectively	   protected.15	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	  abundantly	   clear	   that	   international	   human	   rights	   law’s	   preference	   is	   for	  effective	   protection	   to	   take	   place	   on	   the	   domestic	   level—international	  adjudicatory	  bodies	   are	   intended	  and	  designed	   to	  play	   a	   supplementary	  and	  complementary	   role.	   This	   is	  most	   clearly	   demonstrated	  by	   the	   admissibility	  requirement	   in	   almost	   all	   of	   these	   international	   bodies	   that	   a	   complainant	  would	  have	  exhausted	  all	  domestic	  remedies	  (or	  have	  no	  reasonable	  prospect	  of	   success	   in	   domestic	   law)	   before	   going	   to	   the	   international	   sphere	   for	  resolution.16	  The	  subsidiary	  nature	  of	  these	  adjudicatory	  bodies’	  jurisdictions	  reflects	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   ideal	   relationship	   between	   international	   and	  domestic	  human	  rights	   protection	   as	  both	  a	   reflective	  and	  a	  synergistic	  one.	  International	   human	   rights	   law	   ought	   to	   reflect	   common	   values	   and	  fundamental	   principles	   (or	  at	   least,	   those	   that	  might	  have	  been	   said	   to	  have	  been	  common	  and	  fundamental	  to	  the	  predominantly	  western	  states	  involved	  in	   the	   emergence	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   law17)	   and	   to	   offer	   an	  interlocutor	   with	   which	   domestic	   human	   rights	   (or	   ‘civil	   liberties’)	   law	   can	  converse	  towards	  an	  advantageous	  outcome.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  the	  reflectiveness	  of	  international	   human	   rights	   law	   that	   makes	   it	   appropriate	   as	   a	   synergistic	  partner	   to	   domestic	   constitutional	   law	   in	   liberal	   legalistic	   constitutional	  orders	  such	  as	  that	  found	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  At	   their	   cores,	   both	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   domestic	  constitutional	   law	  are	  built	  on	  a	  common	  dignitary	  core	  of	   individual	   liberty	  
                                                       15	  A	  commitment	  to	  effective	  protection	  of	  rights	  is	  a	  clear	  priority	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  courts	  in	  particular.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Soering	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  439.	  16	  Article	  41,	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  10;	  Article	  5(2),	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (G.A.	  res.	  2200A	  (XXI),	  21	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  16)	  at	  59,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/6316	  (1966),	  999	  U.N.T.S.	  302,	  entered	  
into	  force	  March	  23,	  1976);	  Article	  35(1),	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  7;	  Article	  46(1),	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  supra	  note	  11;	  Article	  6(2),	  Protocol	  to	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  an	  African	  Court	  of	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  (June	  9,	  1998,	  OAU	  Doc.	  OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT	  (III))	  (providing	  that	  admissibility	  is	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  56	  of	  the	  African	  [Banjul]	  Charter	  of	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  (supra	  note	  11)—Article	  56(5)	  requires	  complaints	  only	  to	  be	  sent	  after	  “exhausting	  local	  remedies,	  if	  any,	  unless	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  this	  procedure	  is	  unduly	  prolonged”).	  17	  That	  the	  ‘international	  community’	  as	  it	  existed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  dominated	  by	  western	  states	  is	  well	  accepted	  and	  indeed	  presents	  some	  difficulties	  in	  terms	  of	  using	  the	  nomenclature	  ‘international	  community’.	  It	  is	  used	  in	  this	  article	  to	  describe	  the	  fora,	  organisations,	  law-­‐making	  bodies	  and	  interactions	  of	  states	  in	  relatively	  formalised	  multilateral	  contexts.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  the	  term	  ‘international	  community’	  see,	  for	  example,	  Diane	  Otto,	  Subalternity	  and	  International	  Law:	  The	  
Problems	  of	  Global	  Community	  and	  the	  Incommensurability	  of	  Difference	  5	  SOCIAL	  AND	  LEGAL	  STUDIES	  337-­‐364	  (1996)	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  and	  restriction	  of	  state	  activities.18	  In	  both	  systems—particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  civil	   and	   political	   rights,	   which	   historically	   have	   more	   traction	   in	   most	  domestic	   jurisdictions19—human	   rights	   or	   civil	   liberties	   law	   is	   designed	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   state	  may	   interfere	  with	  one’s	  actions	  only	   inasmuch	  as	   that	  interference	   is	   necessary,	   proportionate,	   and	   objectively	   justifiable.	   When	  boiled	  down	  to	  this	  core	  constitutionalist	  value,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  domestic	  and	  international	  rights	  standards	  that	  may,	  at	  first	  glance,	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘different’	  to	  one	  another	  are	  in	  fact	  more	  similar	  than	  might	  have	  been	  thought	  and	  are	  capable	  of	  synergistic	  existence.	  Domestic	  standards	  and	  actions	  can	  influence	  international	   conceptions	   of	   rights-­‐content	   and	   the	   acceptability	   of	   state	  actions	   and	   vice-­‐versa.	   It	   therefore	   makes	   immense	   common	   sense	   for	   the	  jurisprudence	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   courts	   and	   other	   adjudicatory	  bodies	  to	   inform	  each	  other’s	  activities	   in	   interpreting	  the	  scope	  and	  content	  of	  relevant	  rights	  protections.	  	  These	   authorities	   would	   not	   be	   binding	   precedents,	   but	   persuasive	  ones.	  In	  this	  way,	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  can	  play	  its	   logical	  catalytic	  role	   whereby	   the	   articulation,	   application	   and	   giving	   effect	   to	   of	   rights	   in	  international	   law	  may	  catalyse	  an	  upwards	  harmonisation	  of	   rights	  between	  the	   domestic	   and	   international	   sphere.	   Domestic	   constitutional	   and	   other	  rights-­‐protecting	  standards	  can	  be	  invigorated	  by	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  and	  international	  human	  rights	   law	  can	  evolve	  by	  reference	  to	  domestic	  standards	   in	   general	   with	   international	   adjudicatory	   bodies	   attempting	   to	  recognise	   ‘tipping	  points’	  based	  on	  state	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  on	  principle	  and	  clearly	  articulated	  treaty-­‐based	  standards.	  	  Such	   an	   approach	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   is	   particularly	  apposite	  in	  situations	  where	  domestic	  courts	  are	  grappling	  with	  the	  meaning	  of	   constitutional	   standards	   in	   their	   contemporary	   context.	  While	   the	   ‘list’	   of	  legally	   protected	   rights	   in	   either	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   treaties	   or	  constitutional	   documents	   is	   generally	   static	   (apart	   from	   in	   cases	   of	  amendment	   of	   the	   core	   document),	   the	   content	   of	   those	   rights	   is	   not	  necessarily	   static.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   arguable	   that	   in	   order	   for	   constitutions	   to	  
                                                       18	  For	  a	  masterful	  overview	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  dignity	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  individual	  rights	  both	  domestically	  and	  internationally,	  including	  consideration	  of	  the	  limited	  nature	  of	  dignity	  and	  rights	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  American	  Constitution	  (especially	  in	  relation	  to	  women,	  slaves	  and	  Native	  Americans)	  see	  JACK	  DONNELLY,	  HUMAN	  DIGNITY	  AND	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS,	  Swiss	  Initiative	  to	  
Commemorate	  the	  60th	  Anniversary	  of	  the	  UDHR,	  (2009),	  available	  at	  http://www.udhr60.ch/report/donnelly-­‐HumanDignity_0609.pdf	  (last	  accessed:	  November	  25,	  2009).	  	  	  19	  Economic	  and	  social	  rights	  tend	  to	  face	  serious	  difficulties	  in	  terms	  of	  justiciability	  and	  enforceability	  in	  domestic	  jurisdictions.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Ellen	  Wiles,	  Aspirational	  Principles	  or	  
Enforceable	  Rights?	  The	  Future	  for	  Socio-­Economic	  Rights	  in	  National	  Law	  22	  AMERICAN	  UNIVERSITY	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  REVIEW	  35	  (2006-­‐2007)	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  remain	   ‘fit	   for	  purpose’	   the	  content	  of	   the	  protected	  rights	  must	  evolve	  over	  time.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   may	   be	   one	   that	   is	   constantly	  protected	  but	  its	  content	  may	  change	  over	  time:	  does	  it,	  for	  example,	  include	  a	  right	  for	  celebrities	  to	  be	  free	  from	  invasive	  media	  coverage	  even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  public	   appetite	   for	   such	   coverage?20	   Does	   it	   include	   a	   right	   for	   our	   private,	  adult	  and	  consensual	  sexual	  activity	  to	  be	  free	  from	  state	  interference	  even	  if	  some	  people	  find	  such	  activity	  morally	  abhorrent?21	  These	  questions	  may	  not	  have	   been	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   the	   drafters	   of	   constitutions	   and	   international	  instruments	  but	  they	  are	  questions	  of	  considerable	  contemporary	  importance	  that	   our	   human	   and	   civil	   rights	   law	   must	   address	   unless	   it	   is	   to	   become	  entirely	  detached	  from	  the	  real-­‐life	  challenges	  that	  people	  face.	  	  In	  trying	  to	  reach	  conclusions	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  our	  rights-­‐protecting	  legal	  standards	  protect	  individuals	  in	  circumstances	  of	  this	  kind,	  a	  court	  ought	  to	   have	   recourse	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   sources	   including—I	   argue—international	   human	   rights	   law	   (where	   the	   decision	   is	   being	   made	   by	   a	  domestic	  court)	  and	  comparative	  constitutional	  law	  and	  state	  practice	  (where	  the	  decision	  is	  being	  made	  by	  an	  international	  adjudicatory	  body).	  In	  this	  way,	  both	  bodies	  of	  law	  can	  aid	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  other.	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  next	  part	  of	   this	   Article	   shows,	   such	   a	   synergistic	   and	   catalytic	   relationship	   between	  domestic	   and	   international	   law	   is	   possible	   and	   has	   actually	   been	   evident	   in	  relation	   to	   sexual	   and	   gender	   rights	   in	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   where	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  has	  made	  considerable	  use	  of	  its	  ‘consensus’	  approach	   to	   its	   interpretation	   of	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   in	   the	   European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  when	  faced	  with	  questions	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  identity.	   3. PART	  II:	  	  LGBT	  RIGHTS	  IN	  (WESTERN)	  EUROPE	  Article	   8	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   protects	   the	  right	  to	  respect	  for,	  inter	  alia,	  one’s	  private	  and	  family	  life.	  It	  has	  loomed	  large	  in	   the	   rich	   vein	   of	   jurisprudence	   on	   lesbian,	   gay,	   bisexual	   and	   transsexual	  (LGBT)	   rights	   produced	   by	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   Article	   8	  provides:	  
	   1. Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  his	  private	  and	  family	  life,	  his	  home	  and	  his	  correspondence.	  
                                                       20	  For	  a	  story	  of	  such	  evolution	  see	  Gavin	  Phillipson,	  Transforming	  Breach	  of	  Confidence?	  To-­
wards	  a	  Common	  Law	  Right	  of	  Privacy	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  66	  MODERN	  LAW	  REVIEW	  726	  (2003)	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  decision	  in	  Campbell	  (Appellant)	  v.	  MGN	  Limited	  (Respondents)	  [2004]	  UKHL	  22	  21	  The	  Irish	  Supreme	  Court	  originally	  held	  that,	  in	  constitutional	  terms,	  it	  did	  not:	  Norris	  v	  
Attorney	  General	  [1984]	  IR	  36.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  however,	  held	  that	  in	  ECHR	  terms	  it	  did:	  Norris	  v	  Ireland	  (1988)	  13	  EHRR	  186.	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   2. There	  shall	  be	  no	  interference	  by	  a	  public	  authority	  with	   the	  exercise	  of	   this	  right	  except	   such	  as	   is	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  and	  is	  necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society	  in	  the	  in-­‐terests	  of	  national	  security,	  public	  safety	  or	  the	  economic	  well-­‐being	   of	   the	  country,	   for	   the	  prevention	  of	  disorder	  or	  crime,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	  or	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  others.	  	  The	   right	   to	   private	   life	   has	   been	   used	   to	   challenge	   laws	   that	  criminalise	  homosexual	  sex	  and	  allow	  sexual	  orientation	  to	  be	  a	  used	  as	  a	  bar	  to	   certain	   institutions	   or	   employment.	   Building	   on	   what	   has	   been	   a	   very	  expansive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  within	  Article	  8	  is	  the	  right	  to	  family	   life,	   the	   Court’s	   interpretation	  of	   “family”	  has	  been	  a	  channel	   through	  which	  many	  LGBT	  rights	  campaigners	  have	  aimed	  to	  acquire	  recognition	  and	  protection	   for	   their	   family	   forms	   regardless	   of	   marital	   status.	   As	   a	   result	   of	  Article	  8	  the	  State	  is	  precluded	  from	  exposing	  private	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  life	  and	  
also	   fixed	   with	   a	   positive	   obligation	   not	   to	   obstruct	   one	   from	   choosing	   to	  express	  certain	  intimate	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  life.	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  case	  that	  the	   State	   may	   not	   interfere	   in	   one’s	   Article	   8	   rights	   at	   all.	   Article	   8.2	  specifically	   outlines	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   state	   may	   legitimately	  interfere	   with	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   individual.	   Legitimate	   interference	   requires	  three	  elements:	  	   1. Legal	   interference	   (i.e.	   the	   interference	   has	   the	   quality	   of	  law	  and	  was	  introduced	  through	  legal	  measures);	  2. Necessity	   (i.e.	   the	   interference	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  one	  of	  the	  heads	  included	  in	  Article	  8.2	  –	  national	  security,	  public	   safety,	   national	   well-­‐being,	   public	   order,	   the	   protection	   of	  health	   and	   morals	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   freedoms	   of	  others);	  3. Proportionality	   (i.e.	   the	  measures	   taken	   in	   order	   to	   secure	  one	  of	  the	  heads	  included	  in	  Article	  8.2	  were	  proportionate	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  are	  directed	  towards	  that	  necessity	  and	  do	  not	  overly	  infringe	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals)	  	  The	  jurisprudence	  on	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  Article	  8	  is	  important	  from	  this	  perspective	  because	  it	   illustrates	   the	  capacity	  for	  domestic	  and	  international	  rights	  law	  to	  have	  a	  synergistic	  relationship.	  As	  will	  be	  illustrated	  in	  the	  brief	  survey	   of	   some	   relevant	   jurisprudence	   that	   follows,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	  has	  afforded	  states	  a	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  rights	   where	   appropriate	   but,	   once	   it	   has	   identified	   a	   tipping	   point	   by	  reference	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  legal	  and	  social	  conditions	  in	  nation	  states,	  it	  has	  narrowed	   that	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   to	   naught	   thereby	   requiring	   member	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  states	   to	  amend	   their	  domestic	   law	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Court’s	   interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention	  or	  risk	  being	  in	  breach	  of	  their	  international	  obligations.	  	  The	   first	   ‘battleground’	   in	   LGBT	   rights	   litigation	  under	   the	  European	  Convention	  was	   the	  right	   to	  privacy	  and	  criminalisation	  of	  homosexuality.	   It	  has	   long	   been	   clear	   that	   ‘privacy’	   as	   defined	   within	   Article	   8	   covers	   an	  individual’s	  physical	  and	  moral	  integrity,	  including	  one’s	  sexual	  life.22	  The	  first	  major	  case	  in	  this	  relation	  was	  Dudgeon	  v	  United	  Kingdom.23	  Dudgeon	  claimed	  that	   the	  criminalisation	  of	   consensual	  anal	   sex	   in	  Northern	   Ireland	   infringed	  on	   his	   right	   to	   privacy	   as	   a	   homosexual	   man,	  whereas	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  claimed	  that	  it	  had	  a	  large	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  (i.e.	  discretion)	  in	  situations	  where	   the	   protection	   of	   morals	   were	   concerned.	   Furthermore	   the	   UK	  submitted	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   people	   in	   Northern	   Ireland	   found	   male	  homosexuality	  morally	  unacceptable	  and	  feared	  that	  repealing	  this	  law	  would	  lead	   to	   deterioration	   in	  moral	   standards.	   On	   that	   basis	   the	   UK	   claimed	   that	  maintaining	   criminalisation	   for	   such	   acts	   was	   necessary,	   proportionate	   and	  within	  their	  rights.	  	  While	   accepting	   that	   member	   states	   did	   have	   a	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   in	   issues	   of	   public	  morality	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   “[a]s	   compared	  with	   the	   era	   when	   that	   legislation	   was	   enacted,	   there	   is	   now	   a	   better	  understanding,	   and	   in	   consequence	   an	   increased	   tolerance,	   of	   consensual	  homosexual	  behaviour	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  in	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  the	  member	  States	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	   it	   is	  no	   longer	  considered	   to	  be	  necessary	  or	  appropriate	   to	   treat	   homosexual	   practices	   of	   the	   kind	   now	   in	   question”	   as	  criminal.24	  In	  addition	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  even	  if	  an	  argument	  could	  be	  made	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  legislation	  the	  detrimental	  effects	   it	  would	  have	  on	  people’s	  capacities	   to	   choose	   how	   they	   lived	   their	   lives	   outweighed	   any	   such	  considerations.	   As	   a	   result	   the	   legislation	   was	   deemed	   inconsistent	   with	  Article	  8	  and,	  subsequently,	  repealed	  by	  the	  UK	  government.	  	  One	   of	   only	   four	   dissenting	   judgments	   in	  Dudgeon	  was	   that	   of	   (Irish	  judge)	   Justice	  Walsh,	  whose	   judgment	   concentrated	  on	  whether	   the	   law	  had	  any	  business	  delving	  into	  issues	  of	  personal	  morality	  at	  all.	  Having	  concluded	  that	  if	  the	  State	  has	  a	  legitimate	  interest	  in	  trying	  to	  ensure	  “the	  prevention	  of	  corruption	  and	  …	   the	  preservation	  of	  the	  moral	  ethos	  of	   its	   society”25	   then	  it	  may	   legislate	   for	   personal	   morality,	   Walsh	   J.	   went	   on	   to	   consider	   the	  particular	   role	   of	   religion	   and	   morality	   in	   Northern	   Ireland.	   He	   held	   that	  
                                                       22	  X	  &	  Y	  v	  The	  Netherlands	  (1985)	  8	  EHRR	  235.	  23	  (1981)	  4	  EHRR	  149.	  24	  Id,	  para.	  60	  25	  Id,	  Judgment	  of	  Walsh	  J.,	  para.	  14	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  “[r]eligious	   beliefs	   in	   Northern	   Ireland	   are	   very	   firmly	   held	   and	   directly	  influence	   the	   views	   and	  outlook	  of	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	  persons	   in	  Northern	  Ireland	   on	   questions	   of	   sexual	   morality.	   In	   so	   far	   as	   male	   homosexuality	   is	  concerned,	   and	   particularly	   sodomy,	   this	   attitude	   to	   sexual	   morality	   may	  appear	  to	  set	  the	  people	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  apart	  from	  many	  people	  in	  other	  communities	  in	  Europe,	  but	  whether	  that	  fact	  constitutes	  a	  failing	  is,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	   debatable”.26	  He	   concluded	   that	   there	   had	  been	   no	  breach	   of	   Article	   8	  and	   that	   the	   UK	   government	   was	   entitled	   to	   maintain	   the	   criminalisation	  legislation	  if	  it	  believes	  that	  decriminalisation	  would	  “have	  a	  damaging	  effect	  on	  moral	  attitudes”.27	  	  Given	   this	   approach	   from	   the	   Irish	   judge	   in	   Strasbourg	   it	   should,	  perhaps,	   have	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   Irish	   government	   failed	   to	  decriminalise	   homosexuality	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   appeared	   to	   clearly	  contravene	  the	  European	  Convention	  as	  per	  Dudgeon.	  David	  Norris’	  claim	  that	  the	   same	   legislation	   as	   impugned	   in	   Dudgeon	   was	   unconstitutional	   on	   the	  basis	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  had	  been	  rejected	  by	  the	  Irish	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  1984.28	  In	  the	  course	  of	  that	  judgment	  O’Higgins	  CJ	  (as	  he	  then	  was)	  held	   that,	   through	   the	   references	   to	   God	   in	   the	   Preamble	   to	   the	   Irish	  Constitution,29	   the	   Irish	   people	   were	   “asserting	   and	   acknowledging	   their	  obligation	   to	   Our	   Divine	   Lord	   Jesus	   Christ…proclaiming	   a	   deep	   religious	  conviction	   and	   faith…with	   Christian	   beliefs”	   and	   that,	   as	   a	   result,	   any	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Constitution	  allowed	  for	  “unnatural	  sexual	  conduct	  which	  Christian	  teaching	  held	  to	  be	  gravely	  sinful”	  was	  clearly	  inaccurate.	  The	  clear	  role	  that	  Christian	  concepts	  of	  morality	  played	  in	  this	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  Irish	  government’s	  submissions	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  
                                                       26	  Id,	  para.	  17	  27	  Id,	  para.	  20	  28	  Norris	  v	  Attorney	  General	  [1984]	  IR	  36	  29	  The	  Preamble	  reads:	  	   In	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  Most	  Holy	  Trinity,	  from	  Whom	  is	  all	  authority	  and	  to	  Whom,	  as	  our	  final	  end,	  all	  actions	  both	  of	  men	  and	  States	  must	  be	  referred,	  We	  the	  people	  of	  Eire,	  Humbly	  acknowledging	  all	  our	  obligations	  to	  our	  Divine	  Lord,	  Jesus	  Christ,	  Who	  sus-­‐tained	  our	  fathers	  through	  centuries	  of	  trial,	  Gratefully	  remembering	  their	  heroic	  and	  unremitting	  struggle	  to	  regain	  the	  rightful	  independence	  of	  our	  Nation,	  And	  seeking	  to	  promote	  the	  common	  good,	  with	  due	  observance	  of	  Prudence,	  Justice	  and	  Charity,	  so	  that	  the	  dignity	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  individual	  may	  be	  assured,	  true	  so-­‐cial	  order	  attained,	  the	  unity	  of	  our	  country	  restored,	  and	  concord	  established	  with	  other	  nations,	  Do	  hereby	  adopt,	  enact	  and	  give	  to	  ourselves	  this	  Constitution.	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  na	  hÉireann	  (Constitution	  of	  Ireland)	  (1937).	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  of	   Human	   Rights	   in	   this	   case,	   where	   the	   State	   argued	   that	   “[w]ithin	   broad	  parameters	   the	   moral	   fibre	   of	   a	   democratic	   nation	   is	   a	   matter	   for	   its	   own	  institutions”.30	  The	  Court,	  however,	  rejected	  this	  claim	  on	   the	  grounds	  that	   it	  would	  lead	  to	  “unfettered”31	  state	  discretion	  in	  the	  field	  of	  morality.	  	  Much	  the	  same	  decision	  was	  reached	  against	  Cyprus	  in	  199332	  and	  it	  is	  now	   clear	   that	   any	   laws	   criminalising	   consensual	   homosexual	   activity	   will	  violate	   Article	   8,	   although	   consensual	   heavy	   sado-­‐masochistic	   activity	  between	  homosexuals	  appears	  not	  to	  enjoy	  Article	  8	  protection.33	  	  This	   strong	   statement	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	   court	   on	   moral	  regulation	  and	  homosexuality	  led	  to	  further	  litigation	  claiming	  that	  excluding	  LGBTs	   from	   certain	   institutions	   or	   employments	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	  homosexuality	   is	   also	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   right	   to	   privacy	   under	   Article	   8.	  Successful	  litigation	  was	  then	  taken	  in	  relation	  to	  gays	  in	  the	  military.	  One	  of	  the	   first	   such	  cases	  was	  Lustig-­Praen	  &	  Beckett	   v	  United	  Kingdom34	   involving	  soldiers	   who	   had	   been	   dismissed	   from	   the	   Royal	   Navy	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	  homosexuality.	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   second	   applicant,	   Beckett,	   not	   only	   had	  he	  been	  dismissed	  for	  being	  gay	  but	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation	  leading	  to	  his	  dismissal	  had	  been	  abusive.	  For	  example	  he	  was	  asked	  whether	  he	  had	  bought	  pornography,	  whether	   he	   had	   been	   abused	   as	   a	   child,	   whether	   he	  was	   “the	  butch	   or	   the	   bitch”	   on	   the	   occasion	   of	   his	   first	   intercourse	  with	   his	   current	  partner,	  whether	  he	  used	  condoms	  and	  sex	  aids,	  whether	  he	  had	  sex	  in	  public,	  whether	  his	  parents	  knew	  of	  his	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  bars	  he	  frequented.35	  At	   the	   time	  of	  the	  case	  the	  military	  was	  governed	  by,	   inter	  alia,	  the	  Armed	  Forces’	  Policy	  and	  Guidelines	  on	  Homosexuality	  as	  updated	  by	  the	  Criminal	   Justice	   ad	   Public	   order	   Act	   1994.	   The	   Guidelines	   provided	   that	  homosexuality	  was	  “incompatible	  with	  service	  in	  the	  armed	  forces”	  because	  of	  the	   close	   living	   conditions	   and	   because	   “homosexual	   behaviour	   can	   cause	  offence,	   polarise	   relationships,	   induce	   ill-­‐discipline	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	  damage	  morale	  and	  unit	  effectiveness”.	  Arguments	  of	  this	  nature	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  UK’s	  submissions	  claiming	  no	  violation	  of	  Article	  8.	  	  Firstly,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	   investigations	   into	   the	   applicants’	  homosexuality	   and,	   in	   particular,	   interviews	   with	   the	   applicants	   and	   with	  third	  parties	  as	   to	   their	   sexual	  orientation	  and	  practices	  constituted	  a	  direct	  interference	   with	   their	   rights	   to	   privacy.	   As	   a	   result,	   their	   consequent	  
                                                       30	  JANIS,	  KAY	  &	  BRADLEY,	  EUROPEAN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW:	  TEXT	  AND	  MATERIALS,	  (2nd	  ed.,	  2000),	  282	  31	  Norris	  v	  Ireland	  (1988)	  13	  EHRR	  186.	  32	  Modinos	  v	  Cyprus	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  485	  33	  Laskey,	  Jaggard	  &	  Brown	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  39.	  34	  Judgment,	  27	  September	  1999	  (Applications	  3147/96	  and	  322377/96)	  35	  Id,	  para.	  19	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  dismissal	  from	  the	  armed	  forces	  violated	  Article	  8.	  While	  the	  UK	  government	  accepted	   that	   the	   actions	  might	   be	   deemed	   violatory	   they	   claimed	   that	   they	  were	   allowable	   under	   Article	   8.2	   of	   the	   Convention	   based	   on	   the	   legitimate	  aim	   of	   maintaining	   morale	   among	   military	   personnel	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	   of	  ensuring	   the	   fighting	   power	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   armed	   forces.	   The	  government	   further	   argued	   that	   they	   were	   entitled	   to	   a	   large	   margin	   of	  appreciation	  in	  this	  issue	  given	  the	  divisiveness	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  special	  military	   context.	   The	   government	   strongly	   refuted	   any	   suggestion	   of	  homophobia,	   claiming	   instead	   that	   the	   concerns	   grounding	   the	   policy	   were	  genuinely	   held	   and	   based	   on	   the	   experiences	   of	   those	   accustomed	   to	   the	  pressures	  of	  service	  life.	  On	  the	  contrary	  the	  applicants	  claimed	  that	  the	  policy	  was	  based	  on	  simple	  prejudice.	  	  The	   court	   accepted	   that	   states	   had	   a	   right	   to	   impose	   restrictions	   on	  individual	  rights	  where	  they	  jeopardised	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  but	   that	  such	  threats	  to	  operational	  effectiveness	  had	   to	  be	  substantiated	  by	  reference	   to	   specific	   examples.36	   In	   considering	   whether	   sufficient	   reasons	  existed	  to	  believe	  that	  homosexuals	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  would	  deplete	  morale	  the	   Court	   found	   that	   “the	   perceived	   problems	   which	   were	   identified	   in	   [a	  relevant]	   report	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   fighting	   power	   and	   operational	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	   were	   founded	   solely	   upon	   the	   negative	  attitudes	   of	   heterosexual	   personnel	   towards	   those	   of	   homosexual	  orientation”37	   and	   that	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   represented	   “a	   predisposed	  bias”38	   towards	   homosexuals	   they	   could	  not	   be	   taken	   to	   justify	   violations	   of	  Article	   8	   rights.	   Rather	   the	   Court	   felt	   that	   codes	   of	   conduct	   should	   be	  introduced,	  analogous	   to	   those	   introduced	   in	   relation	   to	  service	  members	  of	  colour	  and	  women	  in	  the	  military.	  On	  the	  basis	  that	  no	  objective	  and	  rational	  justification	  had	  been	  advanced	  to	  justify	  the	  Article	  8	  violation	  the	  Court	  held	  that	   the	   Convention	   did	   not	   permit	   dismissal	   from	   the	   armed	   forces	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  the	  UK	  did	  not	  have	  a	  wide	  enough	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  to	  perpetuate	  this	  policy.39	  	  In	  addition	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  within	  Article	  8	  has	  been	  used	  to	  base	  claims	  relating	   to	   unequal	   ages	  of	   consent	   for	  homosexual	   and	  heterosexual	  sexual	   activity.	   In	   L	   &	   V	   v	   Austria40	   the	   Court	   considered	   whether	   different	  ages	  of	  consent	  for	  heterosexual	  and	  homosexual	   sex	  were	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	   to	   privacy	   in	   Article	   8.	   The	   applicant	   had	   been	   convicted	   of	   illegal	  
                                                       36	  Id,	  para	  82	  37	  Id,	  para	  89	  38	  Id,	  para.	  90	  39	  The	  same	  result	  was	  reached	  in	  Smith	  &	  Grady	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1999)	  29	  EHRR	  493	  and	  
Beck,	  Copp	  &	  Bazeley	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  [2002]	  ECHR	  679	  40	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  55	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  homosexual	   sex	  having	  had	  oral	   sex	  with	  a	  fifteen-­‐year-­‐old	  and	  claimed	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  committed	  any	  criminal	  offence	  had	  he	  done	  so	   with	   a	   female	   partner	   was	   a	   violation	   of	   his	   Article	   8	   rights.	   He	   also	  presented	  a	  broader	   social	  argument	   that	   suggested	   that	   the	   law	  as	   it	   stood	  implied	   that	   younger	   people	   required	   more	   protection	   as	   against	   adults	   in	  homosexual	   relations	   than	   in	   heterosexual	   relations.	   This,	   he	   submitted,	  hampered	  gay	  teenagers	  in	  developing	  their	  sexual	  identities	  and	  attached	  “a	  social	   stigma	   to	   their	   relationships	   with	   adult	   men	   and	   to	   their	   sexual	  orientation	  in	  general”.41	  	  Significantly	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   although	   there	  were	   previous	   cases	  from	  the	  Commission	  that	  allowed	  differential	  ages	  of	  consent	  the	  Convention	  itself	  was	  “a	  living	  instrument,	  which	  has	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  pre-­‐sent-­‐day	   conditions.”42	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   most	   Convention	   member	   states	  had	  equalized	  their	  ages	  of	  consent,	  a	  differential	  age	  of	  consent	  must	  be	  ca-­‐pable	  of	  objective	  and	  reasonable	   justification	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  violating	  the	  Convention.	  The	  criminalization	  of	  the	  complainant	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  differential	  ages	  of	  consent	  was	  therefore	  found	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  Article	  8.	  
	  The	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   has	   also	   established	   that	   the	  right	  to	  privacy	  includes	  a	  right	  to	  identity.	  The	  main	  issue	  faced	  by	  the	  Court,	  however,	   has	   been	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   a	   State	   is	   obliged	   to	   recognise	   one’s	  identity,	   particularly	   where	   someone	   has	   undergone	   gender	   realignment	  surgery.	  Most	  of	  the	  cases	  taken	  in	  relation	  to	  identity	  and	  privacy	  concern	  the	  birth	   certificate	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   a	   state	   is	   required	   to	   put	   in	   place	   a	  mechanism	   for	   amendment	   of	   the	   birth	   certificate	   following	   gender	  realignment.	   This	   issue	   can	   cause	   particular	   difficulties	   as,	   in	   general,	   birth	  certificates	  are	  records	  of	  historical	   fact	   i.e.	   they	  are	  designed	   to	  record	  facts	  as	  of	   the	   time	  of	  birth.	   In	   order	   to	  assess	   gender	  at	   the	   time	  of	  birth,	   purely	  biological	  criterion	   tends	   to	  be	  applied	  and	  even	  then	  this	   tends	   to	  be	  based	  on	   visual	   indicators	   of	   gender.	   Where	   it	   emerges	   that	   those	   biological	  criterion	   did	   not	   accurately	   reflect	   one’s	   gender	   many	   people	   seek	  amendment	  of	  the	  birth	  certificate,	  but	  as	  the	  certificate	  is	  an	  historical	  record	  states	  often	  claim	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  changed.	  	  In	  Rees	  v	  United	  Kingdom,43	  a	  case	  concerning	  a	  post-­‐operative	  female-­‐to-­‐male	   complainant,	   the	   Court	   stressed	   the	   lack	   of	   consensus	   among	   the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   states	   as	   regards	   the	  means	   by	  which	   a	   state	   should	   give	  effect	   to	   one’s	   right	   to	   respect	   for	   their	   private	   life	   and	   identity.	   In	   fact	   the	  
                                                       41	  Id,	  para.	  38	  42	  Id,	  para.	  47	  43	  [1986]	  ECHR	  11	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  Court	  held	  that	  the	  law	  was	  going	  through	  “a	  transitional	  stage”	  in	  this	  respect	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  that	  States	  enjoyed	  a	  very	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  this	  respect.44	  As	  it	  stood	  transsexuals	  in	  the	  UK	  were	  in	  a	  position	  to	  change	  their	  name	  by	  deed	  poll	  and	  to	  have	  that	  change	  recognised	  on	  a	  number	  of	  official	  documents,	  including	  passports.	  By	  indicating	  one’s	  preferred	  prefix	  the	  Court	  felt	   that	   this	   procedure	   went	   some	   way	   towards	   affording	   respect	   to	   one’s	  Article	  8	  rights.	  Despite	  this,	  however,	  there	  were	  certain	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  resident	   in	   the	  UK	  was	  required	   to	   use	   the	  unchangeable	  birth	  certificate	   in	  order	   to	   confirm	   their	   identity,	   which	   caused	   considerable	   embarrassment,	  shame	   and	   hurt	   for	   the	   applicant.	   This	   notwithstanding	   the	   Court	   felt	   that	  amending	  a	  birth	  certificate	  would	  constitute	  falsification	  of	   facts	  at	   the	   time	  of	  birth	  and	   that	  where,	  as	   in	   the	  UK,	   there	  were	   some	   schemes	   in	  place	  by	  which	  realigned	  gender	  can	  be	  recognised	  requiring	  the	  state	  to	  amend	  a	  birth	  certificate	   would	   be	   extending	   the	   state’s	   obligations	   too	   far.	   This	   decision	  was	  based	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  lack	   of	   legal,	   psychological,	   medical	   and	   scientific	   consensus	   extant	   at	   the	  time.	   	  
Rees	   was	   quickly	   followed	   by	   Cossey	   v	   United	   Kingdom,45	   which	  concerned	   a	   post-­‐operative	   male-­‐to-­‐female	   complainant.	   Once	   again	   the	  complainant	   alleged	   that	   the	  UK’s	   failure	   to	   allow	   for	   amendment	   of	   a	   birth	  certificate	  was	  a	  violation	  of	   Cossey’s	  Article	  8	  privacy	  rights.	   The	  Court	   did	  not	  depart	  from	  its	  Rees	  decision	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  felt	  the	  decision	  remained	   in-­‐line	   with	   current	   societal	   conditions.	   The	   State’s	   margin	   of	  appreciation,	   therefore,	   remained	  wide:	   it	  was	  clear	   that	   one’s	   identity	  must	  be	  recognised	  but	  the	  means	  by	  which	  it	  would	  be	  recognised	  and	  respected	  could	   differ	   from	   state	   to	   state.	   In	   the	   later	   case	   of	   Sheffield	   &	   Horsham	   v	  
United	  Kingdom46	  the	  Court	  upheld	  those	  earlier	  decision	  but	  significantly	  did	  ‘scold’	  the	  UK	  for	  not	  having	  advanced	  the	  means	  of	  recognition	  and	  respect	  since	  the	  Rees	  and	  Cossey	  judgments.	  	  The	   first	   case	   in	   which	   an	   applicant	   successfully	   used	   Article	   8	   to	  oblige	   the	   state	   to	   extend	   official	   recognition	   of	   realigned	   gender	   was	   B	   v	  
France.47	   In	   France	   the	   applicant	   was	   strictly	   confined	   in	   terms	   of	   choice	   of	  name	   and	   gender	   was	   encoded	   in	   a	   personal	   identity	   number	   which	   was	  required	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  interactions	  with	  government	  and	  private	  entities.	  As	  a	   result	   of	   this,	   and	   because	   the	   sophisticated	   French	   system	   of	   recording	  personal	   identity	   would	   require	   only	   minor	   changes,	   the	   Court	   found	   that	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  France	   was	   required	   to	   recognise	   the	   applicant’s	   gender.	   Interestingly,	   this	  decision	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  state’s	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  or	  on	  changes	  in	  common	  consensus;	  rather	  it	  was	  based	  on	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  within	  France	  and	  implications	  for	  the	  applicant.	  B	  was	  not,	  therefore,	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  earlier	  decisions	  in	  Rees,	  Cossey	  and	  Sheffield.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  Goodwin	  v	  United	  Kingdom48	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  court	  substantially	   changed	   its	   stance	   in	   this	   relation.	   Christine	   Goodwin	   was	   a	  post-­‐operative	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  transsexual	  who	  sought,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  have	  her	  birth	   certificate	   amended	   to	   reflect	   her	   realigned	   gender.	   Goodwin	   noted	  particularly	   that	   the	   UK	   government	   had	   failed	   to	   take	   appropriate	   steps	   to	  respect	  her	   identity	   despite	   the	  Court’s	   advice	   in	  previous	  cases	   to	  keep	   the	  law	  under	   review	   and	   in	   line	  with	  changes	   in	  comparative	   law.	   She	  stressed	  the	  rapid	  changes	  in	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  and	  social	  attitudes	   towards	  transsexuals	  and	  complained	  that	  these	  were	  not	  matched	  by	  legal	  reform.	  In	  particular	  she	  stressed	  the	  various	  laws	  that	  disadvantaged	  transsexuals	  who	  could	   not	   amend	   their	   birth	   certificate	   and	   the	   significant	   distress	   and	   hurt	  caused	   in	   one’s	  every	  day	   life	  as	  a	   result	  of	   such	   laws	  and	   social	   conditions.	  The	  respondent	  government	  submitted	  that	  as	  there	  was	  no	  generally	  agreed	  or	   accepted	   approach	   among	   the	   member	   states	   in	   relation	   to	   transsexuals	  the	   UK	   enjoyed	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	   this	   matter	   and	   did	   not	  violate	  Article	  8.	  	  In	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  merits	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  held	  that	  in	  order	  to	   be	   effective	   the	   Convention	  must	   have	   regard	   to	   the	   changing	   conditions	  within	  individual	  states	  and	  the	  members	  states	  generally	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  strictly	  bound	  to	  follow	  the	  judgments	  starting	  with	  Rees.	  The	  Court	  particularly	   found	   that	   there	   was	   an	   inconsistency	   in	   English	   law	   whereby	  gender	   realignment	   surgery	   could	   be	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   National	   Health	  Service,	  which	  therefore	  recognises	  transsexualism,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  this	  realigned	   gender	   was	   not	   fully	   recognised	   by	   the	   state.	   The	   Court	   noted	  significant	   growth	   in	   knowledge	   and	   understanding	   of	   transsexualism	   and	  held	   that	   there	   was	   no	   scientific	   argument	   against	   legal	   recognition	   of	  realigned	   gender.	   The	   Court	   found	   that	   only	   four	   member	   states	   (including	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  had	  no	  mechanism	  of	  legal	  recognition	  following	  gender	  realignment	  and	  was	  influenced	  by	   the	  emerging	  international	  consensus	  on	  this	   issue.	   All	   of	   this	   combined	   indicated	   that	   an	   international	   legal,	   social,	  scientific,	   psychological	   and	   medical	   consensus	   on	   transsexualism	   was	  emerging.	  Given	  all	  of	   the	  above,	  and	  given	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  number	  of	   law	  reform	  proposals	  for	  legal	  recognition	  within	  the	  UK	  itself,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	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  there	   had	   been	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   state’s	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   and,	   as	   a	  result,	  a	  violation	  of	  Christine	  Goodwin’s	  Article	  8	  rights.	  	  This	   short	   and	   selective	   survey	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	  Rights’	  approach	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  illustrates	  the	  type	  of	  synergistic	  relationship	  that	  is	  possible	  between	  international	  and	  domestic	  human	  rights	  law.	  Where	  appropriate,	   the	   Court	   used	   the	  margin	   of	  appreciation	   to	   allow	   states	   some	  discretion	  in	  how	  to	  approach	  LGBT	  rights	  but	  where	  a	  tipping	  point	  could	  be	  identified—based	   largely	   on	   emergent	   practice	   in	   other	   states—the	   Court	  issued	  clear	  interpretations	  of	  the	  content	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  as	  it	  related	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  and	  dramatically	  reduced	  the	  margin	  of	  appreciation.	  The	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  is	  a	  key	  concept	  within	  ECHR	  law	  and	  gives	  states	  discretion	   in	   questions	   of	   particular	   sensitivity.	   Importantly,	   however,	   the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  carte	  blanche	  for	  states	  to	  do	  as	  they	   wish.	   As	   a	   consensus	   emerges,	   particularly	   on	   issues	   of	   sensitivity	   or	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  the	  law	  may	  be	  in	  a	  transitional	  stage,	  the	  margin	  will	  become	  narrower	  until	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  acceptable	  for	  a	  state	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  manner	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   convention	   rights	   as	   given	   effect	   by	   common	  European	  practice.	  The	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  therefore	  decreases	  in	  size	  as	  consensus	   increases.	  By	  corollary,	  as	   the	  margin	  decreases	   the	  obligation	  on	  states	  to	  amend	  their	  domestic	  law	  to	  recognise	  changing	  consensus	  increases	  even	  before	  a	  de	   jure	   obligation	  arises	   through	  a	  bright-­‐line	   judgment	  of	   the	  Court	  clarifying	  that	  a	  Convention	  provision	  can	  now	  be	  said	  to	  protect	  certain	  behaviours	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  privacy.	  In	  addition,	  the	  narrower	  the	  margin	  and	   greater	   the	   consensus	   the	  more	  weighty	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   Court	  can	   be	   as	   an	   interpretive	   aid	   in	   domestic	   proceedings	   where	   analogous	  questions—as	  to	  whether,	  for	  example,	  constitutional	  privacy	  rights	  include	  a	  right	  to	  have	  one’s	  realigned	  gender	  recognised	  in	  law—are	  at	  bar.	  	  4. PART	  III:	  INTERNATIONAL	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  LAW	  AND	  US	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  LAW	  Some	   readers	  will	   understandably	   question	   the	   use	   of	   European	   hu-­‐man	   rights	   law	   to	   illustrate	   the	   capacity	   for	   synergy	   between	   international	  and	  domestic	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Are	  there	  not,	  it	  might	  be	  asked,	   serious	  and	  perhaps	  even	  insurmountable	  structural	  and	  other	  obsta-­‐cles	  to	  the	  similar	  use	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  To	  be	  sure	   there	  are	  some	  differences	   that	  have	   to	  be	  considered,	  but	   in	  my	  view	  none	  of	  these	  are	  insurmountable.	  Firstly	   it	  must	  be	  acknowledged	  that,	   through	  their	  ratification	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  all	  member	  states	  have	  accepted	  that	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  the	  decisions	  of	   the	   Court	   to	  which	   they	  are	  party	   are	  binding	  upon	   them	   in	  international	   law.49	   This	   creates	   an	   international	   compulsion	   to	   change	   do-­‐mestic	  law	  where	  inconsistency	  has	  been	  discerned	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	   itself.	   This	   international	   obligation,	   together	  with	   the	   reputa-­‐tional	  and	  potentially	  other	  sanctions	  that	  might	  flow	  from	  a	  failure	  to	  imple-­‐ment	   the	   judgment,	   certainly	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   impact	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  states	  who	  are	  party	  to	  particular	  litigation	  react	  to	  it.	  However,	  other	  states—i.e.	   those	   that	   were	   not	   parties	   to	   the	   particular	   litigation—do	   not	  have	   the	   same	   obligation.	   Nevertheless	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   Court	   to	   find	  other	   states	   in	   breach	   of	   the	  Convention	   in	   comparable	   cases	   (as	   happened,	  for	  example,	  in	  Norris	  v	  Ireland	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Dudgeon	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  con-­‐sidered	  above)	  might	  well	  be	  a	  motivating	  factor.	  In	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  mar-­‐gin	  of	  appreciation	   left	   to	   states	   in	   relation	   to	  what	   the	  Convention	  requires	  there	  may	   also	   be	   a	   temptation	  not	   to	   implement	   domestic	   legal	   changes	   in	  response	   to	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   decisions	   dealing	   with	   other	  states.	  Even	  then,	  however,	  the	  Court’s	  commitment	  to	  evolutive	  and	  dynamic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention	  with	  a	  view	  to	  effective	  rights	  protection	  may	  dissuade	  states	  from	  dragging	  their	  heels	  to	  too	  great	  an	  extent.	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  standing	  of	  the	  Court’s	  de-­‐cisions	  within	  that	  structure	  may,	  then,	  be	  an	  element	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  into	   account	   in	   explaining	   or	   reading	   the	   LGBT	   rights	   example	   laid	   out	  above.50	  The	  United	  States,	  in	  contrast,	  does	  not	  tend	  to	  become	  party	  to	  indi-­‐vidual	   complaints	  mechanisms	   in	   international	  human	  rights	   law.51	  There	   is,	  
                                                       49	  Article	  46(1),	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (supra	  note	  7).	  50	  For	  a	  concise	  description	  of	  this	  structure	  and	  of	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  see	  FIONA	  DE	  LONDRAS	  &	  CLIONA	  KELLY,	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  CONVENTION	  ON	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  ACT:	  OPERATION,	  IMPACT	  AND	  ANALYSIS	  (2010),	  133-­‐141	  51	  The	  United	  States	  has	  failed	  to	  engage	  with	  any	  of	  the	  primary	  complaints	  mechanisms	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  Under	  the	  First	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (supra	  note	  16)	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  may	  hear	  an	  individ-­‐ual	  complaint	  against	  a	  state;	  however	  the	  United	  States	  has	  not	  ratified	  the	  Protocol.	  Under	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women	  (supra	  note	  10)	  similar	  petitions	  may	  be	  heard	  under	  the	  First	  Optional	  Protocol	  (G.A.	  res.	  54/4,	  annex,	  54	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  49)	  at	  5,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/54/49	  (Vol.	  I)	  (2000),	  entered	  into	  force	  Dec.	  22,	  2000);	  however	  the	  United	  States	  has	  failed	  to	  ratify	  this	  treaty	  despite	  signing	  it	  on	  17	  July	  1980.	  Under	  the	  UN	  Convention	  against	  Torture	  (G.A.	  res.	  39/46,	  [annex,	  39	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  51)	  at	  197,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/39/51	  (1984)],	  entered	  into	  force	  June	  26,	  1987)	  individual	  complaints	  can	  be	  heard	  if	  the	  state	  party	  has	  made	  a	  declaration	  to	  this	  effect	  under	  Article	  22;	  the	  United	  States	  has	  failed	  to	  make	  any	  such	  declaration.	  The	  International	  Convention	  on	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  All	  Migrant	  Workers	  and	  Members	  of	  Their	  Families	  (G.A.	  res.	  45/158,	  annex,	  45	  U.N.	  GAOR	  Supp.	  (No.	  49A)	  at	  262,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/45/49	  (1990),	  entered	  into	  force	  1	  July	  2003)	  also	  allows	  for	  an	  individual	  complaint	  mechanism,	  which	  will	  come	  into	  effect	  once	  ten	  states	  have	  made	  the	  necessary	  declaration	  under	  Article	  77;	  the	  United	  States	  has	  neither	  signed	  nor	  ratified	  this	  Convention.	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  then,	  perhaps	  a	  different	  level	  of	  obligation	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  such	  institutions	  relating	   to	   individual	   complaints	  against	  other	  states.	  How-­‐ever,	  even	  though—for	  example—the	  United	  States	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  indi-­‐vidual	   complaints	  mechanism	  of	   the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  under	   the	   In-­‐ternational	   Covenant	   on	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights,	   it	   is	   still	   a	   party	   to	   the	  Covenant	   itself	  and	   therefore	  still	  has	  an	  international	   legal	  obligation	  under	  that	   Covenant.	   The	   decisions	   of	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   can	   touch	   on	  and	  elucidate	  the	  content	  and	  scope	  of	  rights	  within	  that	  Covenant	  and	  there-­‐fore	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  the	  periodic	  reports	  submitted	  by	  the	  US,	  compliance	  with	  the	  Covenant	  will	  be	  judged	  by	  reference	  to	  its	  meaning	  as	  articulated	  in,	  inter	  alia,	  individual	  complaints	  decisions	  of	  the	  Committee.	  Therefore	   there	   is	   an	   obligation—albeit	   perhaps	   an	   obtuse	   one—to	   comply	  with	  these	  decisions	  where	  they	  are	  generalisable	  beyond	  the	  specific	  facts	  of	  individual	   disputes.	   Complying	   with	   that	   obligation	   can	   require	   changes	   to	  domestic	   law	   and,	   indeed,	   compliance—in	   the	   sense	   of	  upwards	  harmonisa-­‐tion	   of	   rights	   protecting	   standards—can	   incorporate	   the	   interpretation	   of	  constitutional	   civil	   rights	   by	   reference	   to,	   inter	   alia,	   international	   human	  rights	   standards	   as	   articulated	   by	   international	   human	   rights	   adjudicatory	  bodies.	  The	  synergistic	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  scenar-­‐ios	  where	  the	  judgments	  or	  decisions	  of	  those	  adjudicatory	  bodies	  are	  binding	  
stricto	  sensu	  on	  the	  individual	  state.	  The	   second	  comment	   that	  might	  be	  made	   about	   the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  European	  example	   to	   the	  United	  States	   is	   the	  alleged	  difference	  in	   the	  relevance	  of	  international	  law	  to	  monist	  and	  dualist	  states.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   Ireland,	   all	   of	   the	   state	   parties	   to	   the	   European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  have	  monist	  legal	  systems	  broadly	  defined.	  This	  means—again	   at	   a	   necessary	   level	   of	   generalisation—that	   international	   law	  ratified	   by	   the	  state	   is	   said	   to	   flow	  directly	   and	  without	  barrier	   into	   the	   do-­‐mestic	   law	  of	  the	  ratifying	  state	  and	  is	  therefore	  subject	  to	  be	  pleaded	  in	  do-­‐mestic	  proceedings.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Ireland	  are,	   in	  contrast,	  dualist	  states52	  where—up	  until	  1998	  and	  2003	  respectively—the	  European	  Conven-­‐tion	   on	   Human	   Rights	   had	   not	   been	   expressly	   incorporated.53	  However,	   as	   I	  have	  written	  elsewhere,	  dualism	  and	  anti-­‐internationalism	  are	  not	  necessary	  bedfellows.54	   In	   fact,	   I	   argue	   that	   among	  dualist	   jurisdictions	   there	   is	  a	   spec-­‐
                                                       52	  On	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  see	  Buvot	  v	  Barbuit	  (1737)	  Talb.	  281;	  Triquet	  v	  Bath	  (1764)	  3	  Burr.	  1478.	  On	  Ireland	  see	  Article	  29.6,	  Bunreacht	  na	  hÉireann	  (Constitution	  of	  Ireland)	  (1937).	  53	  Incorporation	  took	  place	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  means	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998	  and	  in	  Ireland	  (at	  a	  sub-­‐constitutional	  level)	  by	  means	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  2003.	  On	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998	  see	  DAVID	  HOFFMAN	  &	  JOHN	  ROWE,	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  IN	  THE	  UK:	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  THE	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  ACT	  1998	  (2006);	  on	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  2003	  see	  FIONA	  DE	  LONDRAS	  &	  CLIONA	  KELLY,	  supra	  note	  50.	  54	  Fiona	  de	  Londras,	  supra	  note	  3.	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325	  trum	   of	   internationalisation	   relating	   to	   unincorporated	   international	   law.55	  Thus,	  in	  some	  dualist	  states	   judges	  in	  the	  superior	  courts	  are	  quite	  willing	  to	  have	   recourse	   to	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   the	   course	   of	   constitu-­‐tional	  interpretation—this	  is	  quite	  evident	  in	  South	  Africa	  where	  the	  Constitu-­‐tion	  expressly	  calls	  for	  such	  attention	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  international	  human	  rights	  law,56	  but	  such	  an	  express	  reference	  is	  not	  required.	  The	  United	  States	  Consti-­‐tution	   provides	   for	   neither	   a	   strictly	   dualist	   nor	   a	   strictly	   monist	   system	   of	  dealing	  with	  international	  law.	  The	  Supremacy	  Clause	  provides	  for	  customary	  international	   law	   to	   be	   federal	   common	   law57	   and	   jurisprudential	   develop-­‐ment	  has	  resulted	  in	  what	  are	  known	  as	  self-­‐executing	  treaties	  being	  consid-­‐ered	   self-­‐incorporating	   and	   non-­‐self-­‐executing	   treaties	   requiring	   express	   in-­‐corporation.58	   Incorporation	   of	   non-­‐self-­‐executing	   treaties	   makes	   those	  treaties	  binding	  in	  domestic	   law.	  This,	  of	  course,	   is	  relevant	  where	  one	  is	  at-­‐tempting	  to	  assert	  a	  treaty-­‐based	  right	  in	  domestic	  proceedings.	  However,	  the	  kind	  of	   synergistic	   relationship	  between	   international	  human	  rights	   law	  and	  domestic	   constitutional	   law	   envisaged	   by	   this	   author	   does	   not	   hinge	   on	  whether	  a	  piece	  of	  international	   law	  is	  binding	  domestically	  or	  not.	  In	  fact,	  it	  does	  not	  even	  hinge	  on	  whether	   the	  United	   States	  has	   ratified	   the	  particular	  piece	  of	   international	   law.	  It	   is,	  rather,	  concerned	  with	   the	  idea	  that	   interna-­‐tional	  human	  rights	   law	  can	  and	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  persuasive	  body	  of	   law	  relevant	  to	  constitutional	  interpretation	  of	  civil	  rights,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  content	  and	  scope	  of	  those	  civil	  rights	  in	  contemporary	  circumstances.	  When	  Kennedy	  J.,	  for	  example,	  referred	  to	  the	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child	   in	  Roper	  v	  Simmons59	  he	  was	  not	  claiming	   that	   the	  Convention	  was	  internationally	  binding	  on	  the	  United	  States	  (it	  is	  not	  as	  the	  US	  has	  not	  ratified	  it).	   Neither	   was	   he	   asserting	   the	   domestic	   justiciability	   of	   the	   Convention.	  Rather,	   Kennedy	   J.	   was	   using	   the	   Convention	   and	   the	   standards	   set	   down	  within	  it	  as	  a	  benchmark	  for	  the	  appropriate	  scope	  of	  children’s	  rights	  in	  rela-­‐tion	   to	   punishment,	   which	   then	   could	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   process	   of	   constitu-­‐
                                                       55	  Id.	  56	  South	  African	  Constitution	  §	  39	  (1)	  (b)	  (1996).	  57	  Article	  VI,	  US	  Constitution	  as	  interpreted	  in	  The	  Paquette	  Habana	  175	  US	  677	  (1900),	  per	  Gray	  J.,	  700.	  It	  would	  be	  misleading	  to	  suggest	  this	  position	  is	  without	  controversy.	  Supporting	  the	  position	  see,	  for	  example,	  Harold	  Sprout,	  Theories	  as	  to	  the	  Applicability	  of	  International	  Law	  
in	  the	  Federal	  Courts	  of	  the	  United	  States	  26	  AMERICAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  280	  (1932),	  282-­‐285	  and	  Louis	  Henkin,	  International	  Law	  as	  Law	  in	  the	  United	  States	  82	  MICHIGAN	  LAW	  REVIEW	  1555	  (1984),	  1555-­‐1557.	  For	  a	  critical	  perspective	  on	  this	  position	  see,	  for	  example,	  Curtis	  Bradley	  &	  Jack	  Goldsmith,	  Customary	  International	  Law	  as	  Federal	  Common	  Law:	  A	  
Critique	  of	  the	  Modern	  Position	  	  110	  HARVARD	  LAW	  REVIEW	  815	  (1997)	  58	  Foster	  v	  Neil	  27	  US	  253	  (1829).	  The	  position	  is	  reiterated	  in	  the	  Restatement	  (Third)	  of	  Foreign	  Relations	  Law:	  “Courts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  bound	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  international	  law	  and	  to	  international	  agreements	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  except	  that	  a	  'non-­‐self-­‐executing'	  agreement	  will	  not	  be	  given	  effect	  as	  law	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  necessary	  implementation”.	  §	  111.3	  (1986)	  59	  543	  US	  551	  (2005)	  
	  	  INTERNATIONAL	  REVIEW	  OF	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	  –	  VOLUME	  9:2	  	  2009 
 
326	  tional	   interpretation.	   It	   is	   this	   kind	   of	   relationship	   that	   typifies	   the	   synergy	  possible	   between	   international	   and	   domestic	   human	  or	   civil	   rights	   law.	   The	  constitutional	   structures	   in	   the	  United	   States	   do	  not,	   I	   argue,	   serve	  as	  an	   in-­‐surmountable	  barrier	  to	  the	  use	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  constitu-­‐tional	  interpretation	  and	  ought	  not,	  in	  my	  view,	  to	  be	  constructed	  as	  doing	  so.	  Recognising	   the	  potential	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law	   to	  be	   an	  effective	   and	   helpful	   persuasive	   source	   in	   constitutional	   interpretation	   re-­‐quires	   a	   particular	   attitudinal	   approach	   to	   that	   body	   of	   law.	   Discussions	   of	  whether	   international	   or	   domestic	   law	   is	   ‘superior’	   are	   deeply	   unhelpful	   in	  any	  attempt	  to	  ensure	  progression	  towards	  upwards	  harmonisation	  in	  rights	  protection	   and	   can	   arguably	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   hardening	   attitudes	   against	  international	   law	   among	   domestic	   law	   practitioners,	   educators	   and	   judges.	  When	   the	   common	  dignitary	   core	   of	   international	   and	  domestic	   rights	   stan-­‐dards	  considered	  in	  Part	  I	  above	  is	  recognised,	  and	  when	  the	  weighting	  given	  to	  unincorporated	  or	  un-­‐ratified	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  that	  of	  per-­‐suasive	  authority	  within	  a	  common	  law	  jurisdiction,	  any	  fears	  of	  international	  human	  rights	   law	  as	   interloper	  ought	   to	  be	  dispelled.	  Comparative	  constitu-­‐tional	   law	  is	  not	  generally	   seen	  as	  an	  interloping	  body	  of	   law,	  after	  all.60	  The	  difference	  is,	  perhaps,	  that	  when	  making	  their	  decisions	  constitutional	  courts	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  be	  making	  universally	  applicable	  law	  to	  which	  other	  states	  are	  to	  be	  measured	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  adju-­‐dicatory	   bodies	  might	   be	   said	   to.	   But	   those	   international	   bodies	   are	  making	  universally	  applicable	  law	  in	  the	  international	  sphere.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  international	  law	  a	  state	  may	  be	  obliged	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	   law	   and	   practice	   adheres	   to	   certain	   rights-­‐based	   standards.	   The	   claim	   is	  not	   that	   this	   is	   the	   case	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   domestic	   law	   although,	   in	   practical	  terms,	  domestic	   law	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  examined	   for	   its	   compatibility	  with	   those	  international	   standards	   by	   those	   international	   bodies.	   Those	   international	  bodies	   are,	   however,	   assessing	   compatibility	  with	   international	   law	   and	  not	  with	  domestic	   constitutional	   law.	   In	   the	  process	  of	   constitutional	   interpreta-­‐tion,	   domestic	   superior	   courts	   such	   as	   the	  United	   States	   Supreme	   Court	   are	  (generally)	   assessing	   the	   compatibility	   of	   law	   or	   governmental	   action	   with	  domestic	   law	   unless	   international	   standards	   are	   said	   to	   be	   binding.	   A	   truly	  synergistic	  relationship	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  human	  and	  civil	  rights	   law	   would	   see	   courts—where	   applicable—considering	   whether	   the	  scope	  and	  content	  of	  constitutional	  rights	  against	  which	  governmental	  action	  
                                                       60	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  academics	  or	  judges	  approve	  of	  the	  use	  of	  comparative	  constitutional	  law	  in	  domestic	  constitutional	  litigation;	  they	  do	  not.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  because	  of	  any	  claim	  that	  comparative	  constitutional	  law	  in	  some	  ‘trumps’	  or	  is	  superior	  to	  domestic	  constitutional	  law.	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  is	  measured	  can	  and	  should	  be	  interpreted	  by	  reference	  to	  international	  hu-­‐man	  rights	  law	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  comparative	  sources).	  5. CONCLUSION	  	   	   Moving	  the	  discourse	  away	  from	  questions	  of	  superiority	  or	  inferior-­‐ity	  of	   international	   and	  domestic	   human	  rights	   law	   in	   domestic	   litigation	  al-­‐lows	   us	   to	   refocus	   debates	   on	   the	   appropriate	   use	   of	   international	   human	  rights	   law	   in	   domestic	   proceedings.	   This	   refocusing	   reminds	   us	   that,	   when	  used	  as	  an	  aid	  to	  constitutional	  interpretation,	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  can	   develop	   a	   synergy	   with	   domestic	   rights	   law	   (whether	   termed	   ‘human	  rights’	  or	   ‘civil	   rights’	   law)	   that	  enables	   the	  upwards	  harmonisation	  of	   these	  bodies	  of	  law	  so	  that	  domestic	  law	  protects	  individual	  rights	  effectively.	  Inter-­‐national	   human	   rights	   laws’	   various	   adjudicatory	   bodies—such	   as	   regional	  courts	  and	  treaty-­‐based	  committees—produce	  jurisprudence	  that	  can	  be	  par-­‐ticularly	  useful	  in	  interpreting	  the	  scope	  and	  content	  of	  rights	  in	  a	  contempo-­‐rary	   and	   effective	   manner,	   taking	   into	   account	   developments	   in	   a	   range	   of	  states.	   This	   jurisprudence	   offers	   an	   obvious	   persuasive	   value	   to	   the	   United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  when	  it	  is	  grappling	  with	  analogous	  questions	  to	  those	  international	  institutions,	  albeit	  in	  domestic	  contexts.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  international	  courts’	  and	  committees’	  decisions	  are	  binding	  on	   the	  United	  States:	  unless	   the	  US	  has	   accepted	   their	  jurisdictions	  then	  they	  are	  not,	  either	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  international	  or	  domestic	  law.	  However,	  non-­‐binding	  decisions	  can	  offer	  guidance	  to	  superior	  courts	  in	  all	  jurisdictions.	  Where	  the	  basic	  value	  underlying	  the	  rights	  protecting	  provi-­‐sions	   in	   the	   international	   and	   domestic	   sphere	   is	   analogous	   and	   essentially	  dignitary,	  the	  persuasive	  value	  of	  this	   international	   jurisprudence	  appears	  to	  be	  all	   the	  more	  obvious.	  Courts	  all	  over	  the	  world—both	  domestic	  and	  inter-­‐national—are	  constantly	  struggling	  with	  how	  to	  ensure	   that	  their	  basic	  texts	  are	  fit	  for	  purpose	  while	  not	  mutilating	  their	  meaning	  beyond	  clear	  literal	  and	  teleological	   grounds.	   Inter-­‐institutional	   and	   inter-­‐jurisdictional	   learning	   is	  both	  sensible	  from	  a	  common	  sense	  perspective	  and	  productive	  from	  the	  per-­‐spective	  of	  catalysing	  upwards	  harmonisation	  of	  rights	  protection.	  This	  has,	  as	  illustrated	   in	   Part	   II,	   happened	   and	  worked	   in	   the	   context	   of	   LGBT	   rights	   in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and,	  as	  argued	  in	  Part	  III,	  the	  structural	  differences	  be-­‐tween	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States	  are	  not	  so	  immense	  as	  to	  make	  a	  similar	  process	  possible	  and	  appropriate	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  US	  Constitution.	  Writing	  to	  Samuel	  Kercheval	  in	  1816,	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  stated:	  Some	  men	   look	  at	   constitutions	  with	  sanctimonious	  reverence	  and	  deem	  them	   like	   the	  ark	  of	   the	  covenant,	   too	  sacred	  to	  be	  touched.	  They	  ascribe	  to	  the	  men	  of	  the	  preced-­‐
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   ing	  age	  a	  wisdom	  more	  than	  human	  and	  suppose	  what	  they	  did	   to	   be	   beyond	   amendment.	   I	   knew	   that	   age	   well;	   I	   be-­‐longed	  to	  it	  and	  labored	  with	  it.	  It	  deserved	  well	  of	  its	  coun-­‐try.	   It	  was	  very	   like	   the	  present	  but	  without	   the	  experience	  of	  the	  present;	  and	  forty	  years	  of	  experience	  in	  government	  is	  worth	  a	  century	  of	  book-­‐reading;	  and	  this	  they	  would	  say	  themselves	  were	  they	  to	  rise	  from	  the	  dead.	  It	  seems	  difficult	  to	  disagree	  with	  the	  sentiment.	  Learning	  from	  expe-­‐rience—whether	  our	  own	  or	  that	  of	  others—and	  ensuring	  the	  contemporane-­‐ousness	   of	   the	   fundamental	   guarantees	   of	   the	   Constitution,	  without	   eroding	  their	   substance	   and	   dignitary	   foundation,	   are	   naturally	   collative	   processes.	  International	   human	   rights	   law	   is	   another	   source	   that	   can	   and	   should	   be	  reached	  for	  in	  the	  process	  of	  interpreting	  domestic	  constitutional	  guarantees	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and,	  indeed,	  elsewhere.	  	  	  
